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The growth of precarious employment in Great Britain
Timothy WHITTON
Université de Clermont-Ferrand II
Abstract
The growth of precarious employment in Great Britain
For  some  time  now foreign  observers  have  been  showering  praise  on  the  British  labour
market and above all its ability to create jobs. There is no denying that officials statistics show
that unemployment has dropped considerably in Great Britain but this particular aspect of the
country’s  economic  health  conceals  other  evils  including  growth in  the precariousness  of
employment for large sections of the working population. To some extent, this can be put
down to the current drive to foster employability and flexibility but there is no doubt that it
has inevitably led to mass poverty and a significant growth in underemployment. Precarious
employment comes in all shapes and sizes but whether part-time work or fixed-term contracts,
the labour market has had to adapt. Other countries have made substantial efforts to enhance
the value of “atypical” employment whereas in Great Britain, it  has been relegated to the
fringes of the market thus depriving employees of the rights that core workers can enjoy. By
itself, the national minimum wage can only protect low paid workers from the worst forms of
exploitation. Wage protection could be complemented by specific measures designed to deal
with precarious employment and prevent it from being marginalized even further.
Résumé
LA PRECARISATION DE L’EMPLOI EN GRANDE-BRETAGNE
Certains observateurs étrangers et notamment français ne tarissent pas d’éloges concernant
la capacité du marché du travail britannique à créer des emplois. Si on s’en tient aux seules
statistiques il est indéniable qu’en Grande-Bretagne le chômage a considérablement reculé.
Mais  cet  aspect  de  la  santé  économique  du  pays  cache  son  lot  de  misères  dont
principalement, en vertu de la flexibilité et de l’employabilité, une précarisation accrue de
larges pans de la population active. Celle-ci a inévitablement contribué à une pauvreté de
masse et crée de nombreux emplois de mauvaise qualité. L’emploi précaire se décline sous
des formes différentes mais qu’il s’agisse de travail à temps partiel ou des contrats à durée
déterminée, le marché du travail a dû s’y adapter. D’autres pays ont su valoriser la nature
« atypique » de ce type d’emploi tandis qu’en Grande-Bretagne il a été relégué aux confins
du  marché  du  travail.  Les  titulaires  d’emplois  précaires  sont  de  fait  privés  d’accès  aux
conditions  de  travail  dont  peuvent  bénéficier  les  autres  salariés.  Isolément,  le  salaire
minimum  interprofessionnel  ne  peut  que  protéger  les  formes  d’exploitation  les  plus
flagrantes. Pour éviter que l’emploi précaire ne soit davantage marginalisé, la protection des
salaires doit être associée à un ensemble de mesures préventives.
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During the past decade one of the most remarkable features of the British labour market
has been its apparent ability to create employment. The days of mass unemployment which
considerably  bogged  down  the  British  economy  in  the  seventies  and  then  caused  such
hardship at the beginning of the eighties seem to be a thing of the past. For some time now it
has even been fashionable to speak of  “full employment” without being branded a naïve
idealist.  And this  phenomenon  seems to  be  contagious  to  the  extent  that  other  European
nations  are  attempting  to  follow  suit.  By  constantly  vaunting  the  merits  of  employment
policies in Great Britain, they have created the British labour market paradigm. For once, and
notwithstanding methods used to count the jobless, Britain is playing a role model for her
European partners whose rates of unemployment remain stubbornly high.
At first sight this may seem absurd given the high unemployment figures recorded during
the Thatcher decade but these were perhaps the result of the “there is no alternative approach”
which characterised the Conservatives’ determination to redress the British economy.  Their
hope was that by promising better days after a radical shake up of British industry, they would
enable public opinion to bite the bullet more easily.
And bite the bullet they did by returning the Conservatives to power on four successive
occasions. Even though unemployment reached unprecedented figures in 1983, it gradually
fell  off  as  the  Conservatives  swapped  Keynesian  inspired  policies  for  market  led  ones.1
Obstacles impeding employment were gradually discarded in the wake of the onslaught on
trade union influence while the emphasis was laid on fostering a climate of labour flexibility
in order to reduce structural unemployment. Traditional labour patterns were -  and still are -
by far the norm but the considerable loosening of work regulations have given birth to a
multiplicity of job contracts hitherto shunned by the mainstream labour market. Temporary,
casual and above all part-time work now concern a far higher number of British workers than
ever before.
The  result  of  this  has  supposedly  been  increased  employability,  one  of  the  Blair
government’s favourite themes. By using employability as their main active labour market
policy, New Labour has been able to kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand people
who  could  work  but  do  not  can  be  considered  as  being  available  for  work  rather  than
unemployable. This can be used to paint an entirely different picture of overall unemployment
figures: the OECD, for example, prefers to consider the rate of activity of a country’s working
population rather than the number of people employed since this enables a better assessment
of the workforce’s adaptability to the labour market.2 On the other, increased employability
goes hand in hand with workfare policies since once people have been shown the path back
into the labour market, punishing their refusal to accept employment by withdrawing benefit
becomes far more legitimate. 
All  in  all  therefore,  for  an increasing  proportion  of  the  British labour  force,  the  work
climate has become precarious not in the sense of severe competition between top executives
vying for six or seven figure salaries but for ex-core employees. The more one moves towards
the fringes of the core employment zones, the more employment is precarious, atypical and
subjected to the whims of the market. Although the recent introduction of a national minimum
1 At the same time the French government was doing the opposite by increasing minimum wages, reducing 
working time with no parallel wage reduction, increasing public service employment and encouraging public 
expenditure. Insofar as this was widely perceived as being a failure, it signalled a temporary victory for the 
emerging neo-classical ideas.
2 See my article “Welfare to Work : Integrating the British Labour Market”, in, Martine AZUELOS & Marie-
Claude ESPOSITO (CERVEPAS), Travail et Emploi : l’Expérience Anglo-Saxonne, Paris: l’Harmattan, p. 274 
and particularly note 9, p. 275.
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wage has sought to address this particular issue, growing precariousness is perhaps the darkest
side of the British labour market paradigm that foreign observers fail to comprehend.
The Thatcher legacy
It  is  perhaps  understandable  that  given the high rates  of  structural  unemployment,  the
growth of precarious employment was hardly a major preoccupation for British governments.
In many respects precarious work was seen as being an inevitable fact of labour market life
and was both condemned and tolerated as such. All government energy was channelled into
finding solutions to halt the growth of unemployment. Until 1979, it was considered in typical
Keynesian style, that a growth in aggregate demand could increase employment. The New
Right discarded this conception of the market and instead promoted the idea that wages and
employment were two distinct variables: high wages destroyed employment and all the more
so when they were dictated by corporate forces such as trade unions. Wages should be paid
according to demand, or worth and not according to the artificial levels established by the
collective force of organised labour.
The  1978-79 Winter  of  Discontent  which  concluded  the  fiasco  of  the  Social  Contract
perhaps gave the newly elected Conservative government the impetus it needed to confront
the unions. Hostility came to a head during the year long miners’ strike in 1984-85 during
which the Prime Minister described the unions as the “enemy from within”, comparing them
with the Argentineans who during the Falklands’ crisis had been the “enemy from without”.
Further legislation during the decade reduced the trade unions’ power even further.3
Despite this, it was probably unemployment which made the greatest inroads into trade
union influence. Certain union practises such as over manning had maintained high levels of
employment in British industry but these weaknesses were gradually being weeded out by the
ruthless application of market forces. The Conservatives also embarked on an ambitious plan
of privatisation which corresponded not only to their ideological stance of “rolling back the
frontiers of the state” but also to their  desire to adapt the economy to the realities of the
expanding  world  market.   Unemployment  thus  soared  reaching  an  official  11% in  1983
following  a  period  during  which  the  traditional  manufacturing  and  so-called  “heavy”  or
“staple” industries (steel and coal mining for example) had shed impressive quantities of jobs.
Competition from abroad had contributed to reducing the attractiveness of many products and
the British government was in no way inclined to use public money to bale out lame duck
sectors of industry.
While the influence of organised labour was being reduced, both by legislation and the
realities of the job market, the Conservatives, in the face of growing social hardship, extolled
the merits  of work as compared to welfare dependency which according to them, a large
proportion of the population had adopted as a lifestyle. In order to promote the work ethic and
increase the attraction of paid employment,  benefits  were linked more and more to prices
rather  than  to  inflation  and  means  testing  was  rehabilitated  under  the  auspices  of  the
government’s  desire  to  target  welfare  resources  more  precisely.  At  the  same  time  the
government prepared itself to abandon minimum wage protection by first rescinding the Fair
Wages resolution in 1982.4 This was followed in 1985 by a consultative document devoted to
the British Wages Councils in which the government questioned the relevance of maintaining
such  a  system.5 6 The  minimum  wage  protection  afforded  by  the  Wages  Councils  was
3 The 1980, 1982, 1988, 1989 and 1990 Employment Acts, and the 1984 Trade Unions Act.
4 For further information see my article “Adieu aux Wages Councils”, Revue Française de Civilisation 
Britannique, vol. 8, n°2, juillet 1995, pp. 65-79, and more particularly note 3.
5 For a full description of the Wages Councils see my article mentioned in note 4 and also Timothy WHITTON, 
“Wages Councils: bilan”, Alizés, Trade Winds, n° 7, January 1994, pp. 67-90.
6 Department of Employment, Consultative Paper on Wages Councils, London: HMSO, 1985.
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modified a year later in 1986 notably by removing young people from their scope and in 1988
a second period of consultation began. The accompanying document once again set out the
Conservatives’ main arguments for getting rid of the Councils  emphasising that minimum
wage legislation destroyed employment prospects for many potential workers.7 In the parlance
of the New Right, minimum wages represented a rigidity that upset the natural workings of
market forces and in their  opinion the concentration of pay levels around the floor set by
Parliament through the workings of the Wages Councils tended to prove this. They postulated
that without this intervention employers would be able to set wages according to their market
clearing  level.  In  this  respect  minimum  wage  fixing  machinery  not  only  represented  an
external interference, albeit imbued with notions of fairness or decency, but also hindered the
creation of employment,  albeit  low paid. The scene was being set for the emergence of a
legitimately low wage based economy according to the principle that “low wages are better
than no wages”.8
This type of concern was echoed very clearly in the parliamentary debates concerning the
Trades Unions Reform and Employment Rights (TURER) Bill and more particularly Clause
n°28  which  set  out  the  abolition  of  the  Wages  Councils  and  became  law  in  1993.9
Conservative Members of Parliament debating the legislation spoke of the decentralisation of
wage bargaining which had largely replaced national collective agreements. They added that
not only should wages fall within the realm of individual negotiations between employer and
employee  but  in  fact  the  whole  contract  that  binds  the  two  parties  in  their  professional
relationship. They concluded by stating that any form of external intervention that might upset
this “natural” equilibrium was superfluous and needed to be discarded.
Precarious employment and employees
Given the political landscape drawn during the “Thatcher” decade it would be convenient
to suggest that neo classical theory gave far greater scope for precarious employment practises
to the detriment of traditional labour market values. In this context, atypical jobs “form[ed] a
device used by employers to restore to wages the character of variable cost which had been
partially lost”.10 Indeed, in the New Right’s ideology the State had specific responsibilities as
far as the interaction between the economy and employment policies were concerned. Their
main ambition was to foster an environment favourable to technological innovation, higher
productivity  and increased  participation  in  international  business  and in  their  opinion  the
labour  market  should  be designed to  meet  these  objectives.  The unemployed  were  to  be
“activated” or “reactivated” so as to reap the benefits of paid employment of whatever shape
or size.11 
Thus the various forms of officially recognised precarious employment - temporary, part-
time, fixed contract and casual work, sole traders and small employers – can be considered to
be  an  asset  since  they  are  not  only  a  vast  improvement  over  unemployment  but  also
correspond to the adaptation of labour to the requirements of the modern more global market.
It is already clear how the development of these new forms of employment constitute
one means of coping with the rigidities of Keynesian regulation; but discussion is still
7 Department of Employment, Wages Councils: 1988 Consultation Document, London: HMSO, 1988.
8 D. FORREST & S.R. DENNISON, Low Pay or No Pay? A Review of the Theory and Practice of Minimum 
Wage Laws,  London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1983.
9 The Agricultural Wages Council escaped the axe and still exists today (2002).
10 Guy CAIRE, “Atypical Wage Employment in France”, in Gerry & Janine RODGERS, Precarious Jobs in 
Labour Market Regulation: the Growth of Atypical Employment in Western Europe, International Labour 
Organisation, Free University of Brussels, International Institute for Labour Studies, 1989, p. 105.
11 “Activating” the supposedly large pool of unemployed workers was particularly fashionable in France during 
negotiations about the 35hour week between the Minister for Employment, Martine Aubry and the MEDEF.
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continuing on whether or not, in the current climate of recession, they highlight the
realities of an emerging neo-liberal type of regulation.12
The absence of minimum wage legislation until recently is not the only element which has
contributed  to  the  structural  characteristics  of  precarious  employment  in  Great  Britain.
Comparisons with other European countries provide a valuable insight into how Britain has
dealt specifically with atypical employment in an attempt to integrate it into the patchwork of
the mainstream labour market.13 Even so, it is dangerous to reach far-sweeping conclusions on
the basis of these comparisons since:
[t]he various types of [precarious] employment are not distributed comparably in the
structure  of  the  European labour market.  Some occupational  groups are connected
more with stable employment status than others and size of enterprise also has to be
taken  into  account.  Similarly,  people  are  not  affected  in  the  same  way  by  non-
permanent or part-time contracts depending on whether they are young or less young,
men or women, Irish or Algerians. These structural differences need to be taken into
account in our analysis of the extent to which precarious status entails  or does not
entail precarious working conditions.14
In global terms, only a very low percentage (9% in 1998) of employees in Great Britain
have a fixed-term or temporary work contract. The figure for France stands at 22%. On the
other hand Britain has the highest level of part-time employment -  whether permanent or
temporary contracts - of all the European countries which can be explained by the absence of
general legislation on working hours. In view of this, it is perhaps more relevant to refer to a
high level of “atypical” or “non-standard” employment in Great Britain. This form of work
seems to be developing in the countries of the European union but in varying proportions: for
example while France resorts to more fixed-time contracts, Britain prefers part-time work but
often  on  a  permanent  basis.  This  is  all  the  more  obvious  when  figures  at  the  time  of
recruitment,  or  shortly  afterwards,  are  taken  into  consideration:  while  some  European
countries make use of precarious employment – more often than not in the form of fixed-
contract  employment  for  the  duration  of  the  probation  period  –  in  order  to  verify  an
employee’s capacity to hold down a job, Britain has a tendency to consider it as a permanent
aspect of the labour market. In other words precarious employment is not a springboard to a
more permanent employment status but has become an acceptable long-term form of labour.
A  cross-examination  of  precarious  employment  sectors  in  Europe  and  former  Wages
Councils’ industries in Great Britain highlights the fact that both offer striking similarities.
Before abolition, the largest councils established minimum wages for workers in the retail and
catering industries. Although the latter includes high levels of seasonal employment which is
often by nature precarious because of the domination of casual,  temporary and fixed-time
contracts,  analysis  by  the  Low  Pay  Unit  of  rates  of  pay  in  the  former  Wages  Council
industries shows a deterioration in employment conditions since abolition in 1993. Not only
did wages fall after abolition, but also a great many full-time work contracts were transformed
into part-time ones.15 Similarities can also be found as far as the age and qualifications of
12 Guy CAIRE, “Atypical Wage Employment in France”, op. cit., p. 105.
13 Information taken from a) Véronique LETOURNEAUX, Precarious Employment and Working Conditions in 
Europe, Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1998 & b) Véronique 
LETOURNEAUX, Precarious Employment and Working Conditions in the European Union, European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Ireland, Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, date not indicated.
14 Ibid. a) p. 20.
15 See my article, “Labour’s National Minimum Wage”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, vol. 10, 
n°3, novembre 1997, p. 123 & Andrew BEVINS, “Part-time Boom Boosts Jobless Figures”, The Observer, 19 
March, 1995, p. 2.
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precarious workers are concerned. Generally speaking the occupational groups most exposed
to precarious employment have low levels of qualification. The under-25s and to a certain
extent  workers  over  the  age  of  55  are  primarily  affected  by  precarious  employment
conditions. Women and the foreign population as a whole are overall more likely to have
precarious work contracts and Britain is no exception to this rule.16
Part-time employment
The capacity of European labour markets to create large volumes of employment over the
past decade owe a great deal to the considerable increase in part-time work. For some, part-
time  employment  is  an  appropriate  method  to  redistribute  work  so  as  to  reduce
unemployment. It also has the added advantage of enabling employees, should they so desire,
to adapt working hours to the requirements of family life for example. In this case and above
all when part-time work corresponds both to the express desire of the employee and to the
contractual agreement into which he enters with his employer, it is difficult to consider this
particular employer status as being precarious.17 On the other hand, part-time employment can
be seen as labour having to adapt to the requirements of modern industry with employees
being at the beck and call of their employers.18 Whichever viewpoint is chosen, there is no
question that part-time work is certainly one of the major changes that the European - and
especially British - labour markets have undergone recently.
One of  the  main  questions  that  part-time  employment  raises  is  whether  it  is  in  fact  a
response to “Keynesian rigidities” or just one of the “realities of an emerging neo-liberal type
of  regulation”.  There  is  no  doubt  even  so  that  “while  the  development  of  part-time
employment was favoured by the unemployment crisis at the beginning of the eighties, it has
since  become  a  structural  element  in  non-manual  employment  in  northern  Europe”.19
According to OECD statistics in the European Union “the prevalence of part-time work has
risen from 13,3% [of the labour force]  in 1990 to 16,4% in 1999”.20 The same source also
indicates that in 1999, 23% of British employees were working part-time of whom 80% were
women.21 This can be compared with the 31% and 77% respectfully in the Netherlands and
the  8% and  77% in  Spain.  Luxembourg  has  the  highest  percentage  of  part-time  women
workers (92%) and Finland the lowest. Between 1984 and 1999, the proportion of women
working part-time remained constant at around 45% but for the same period, the number of
male part timers more than doubled from 4% to 9%.22 This can be explained partially by the
fact that the scarcity of full-time work in the 1980s compounded by the upswing of the service
sector  forced  many  men  into  accepting  part-time  work.  Once  this  initial  trend  had  been
absorbed by the market,  the internal  dynamism of part-time employment  tended to create
opportunities for job seekers. 
The response to the question concerning the acceptance of the radical swell in part-time
employment lies in the approach a country adopts in integrating it into the main-stream labour
market. In this way it is possible to assess whether the deterioration in employment conditions
16 15% of foreign workers in the EU are self-employed in comparison with 11% of all European workers 
(Véronique LETOURNEAUX op. cit., note 13).
17 See “Civil Service leads the way in making part-time an employee’s flexible friend”, The Guardian, 27 July, 
1990, p. 13, for an edifying and rather astounding account of one particular instance of personnel policy in the 
public sector where part-time employment is fully integrated into the overall employment pattern.
18 Will HUTTON, “A Country of Casuals”, The Guardian, 30 March, 1993, p. 20 & Rachel SPENCE, “Jobs & 
Money: Jobs: Work/Life balance: When flexible isn’t so friendly”, The Guardian, 13 January, 2001, p. 28.
19 Danièle MEULDERS, Olivier PLASMAN & Robert PLASMAN, Atypical Employment in the European 
Community, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994, p.232.
20 The Economist, June 24, 2000, p. 162.
21 For France the figures stand at 14% of part-timers of whom 79% are women, ibid.
22 The Stationery Office, Social Inequalities, 2000 edition, p. 75.
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has merely been a concomitant of recession or whether longer term structural changes are in
progress. Comparisons with other European countries are once more edifying:
Part-time work is essentially a similar gender compromise across national boundaries:
women are able to enter the labour market and meet the particular labour requirements of
service sector employees without disrupting men’s traditional ‘breadwinner’ status at the
workplace or at home.23 
In Sweden for example, where the reduction of inequalities and the redistribution of wealth
has traditionally been at the heart  of social  development,  part-time employment  has been
particularly beneficial for the integration of women into the labour market.  But this occurred
against a backdrop of full employment policies that began faltering in the 1980s to the extent
that part-timers now work longer hours in Sweden than in Great Britain. In France, female
part-time work is far more associated with the reduction and flexibilisation of employment
and  is  thus  a  far  more  recent  cultural  phenomenon.  In  Great  Britain,  the  institutional
framework tends to encourage women with children living with a partner to work part-time
rather than dissuading them from working altogether.24 The lack of public support for child
care and the fiscal advantages that both employers and employees enjoy when only a few
hours are worked – 16 hours per week until 1994 and 8 since then - act as strong incentives
for accepting part-time employment.25 
 The Trades Union Congress has recognised this and is particularly aware of the problems
posed to union legitimacy should part-time work continue to increase on such a scale. Their
aim is to secure “part-time jobs with full-time rights, which represent a choice over working
time which many people will wish to make over the course of their working lives”.26 This
analysis sums up the sort of challenge – as indicated by the title of the TUC’s paper -  that not
only trades unions are having to face but also governments. For unions, part-time work can
represent a threat to organised labour:
The importance of recruiting part timers must be clear to all officers and members –
firstly by the millennium one in three workers will be part-time and the future strength of
the  trade  union movement  depends  upon it  and secondly,  there  are  great  dangers  in
allowing the development of an unorganised sector particularly within workplaces where
full-time workers are unionised as this provides employees with the opportunity to divide
workers and undermine the jobs, terms and conditions of full-time workers.27 (emphasis
added)
For  governments  on  the  other  hand,  should  they  so  desire,  part-time  employment  can
indeed  represent  a  useful  weapon  to  weaken  trade  union  influence  given  the  inherent
difficulties  in  harnessing  the  support  of  traditionally  “unorganised”  workers.  Thus,  the
protection of part timers has represented a major challenge to trade union culture itself which
is more used to dealing with traditional workforces and patterns of employment. Nevertheless,
[b]y focussing their claims on improving the protection afforded to part-time workers, the
23 Jacqueline O’REILLY & Colette FAGAN, “Introduction”, in, Part-time Prospects: an International 
Comparison of Part-time work in Europe, North America and the Pacific Rim, London: Routledge, 1998, p. 23.
24 Anne-Marie DAUNE-RICHARD, “How does the ‘Societal Effect’ shape the use of Part-Time work in France,
the UK and Sweden?”, in, Jacqueline O’REILLY & Colette FAGAN, op. cit., p. 220.
25 For an explanation of the interaction and evolution of wage supplementing see my article “Income 
Supplementing and the Poverty Trap: Speenhamland Revisited?” in, Patrick BARBER & Timothy WHITTON 
(eds), The Dynamics of Time at Work: an Anglo-French Parspective, London: The Management Centre, 1995, p.
114-123.
26 TUC Labour Research Department, Part of the Union? The Challenge of Recruiting and Organising Part-time
Workers, TUC, 1996, §12.
27 Ibid., §26.
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trade unions have, paradoxically, helped to reinforce the distinction which separates them
from full-time workers and makes them a distinctive category.28 In this sense the unions have
somewhat contributed to the supply-side segmentation of the labour market rather than to the
enhancement of the specific skills and productivity that the part-time status involves. In neo-
classical  theory these forces should converge but in practise supply-side segmentation has
revealed itself to be not only a persistent feature of labour markets, but in the case of Great
Britain, also to go hand in hand with the endorsement of flexible work patterns. These are
considered to be the way in which the British labour market should adjust to the requirements
of the emerging global economy and part-time employment fits into this pattern perfectly,
especially when linked to active labour market policies:
Part-time employment appears as an alternative to income supplied by the state, thus
by  society  as  a  whole,  to  the  unemployed.  This  policy  seeks  to  maximise  labour’s
contribution to the income maintenance of the unemployed which is consistent with the
more general trend in labour market regulation.29 
To this end and perfectly in tune with trends in the American labour market, the past decade
has given birth to employability whereby responsible adults have a duty to acknowledge that
their particular skills can be transformed into useful employment.
Flexibility and employability
On returning from his first European Council summit in Amsterdam some six weeks after
the General Elections  which saw “New” Labour win its landslide victory,  Prime Minister
Tony Blair reported on agreement reached on employment policies in the following way:
The European Council also agreed a resolution on employment with British ideas at
the centre of it. We have shown that alongside low inflation and sound public finances,
Europe needs a new approach to employment and growth,  based on British ideas for
competitiveness, introducing more flexible labour markets and employability. That means
creating a more skilled and adaptable workforce, better equipped to cope with economic
change. It also means a new emphasis on getting people off welfare and into work.30
By clearly endorsing his predecessors’ labour market - and more astonishingly - general
economic policies, Tony Blair was giving Parliament a clear insight into the line of action that
it could expect his government to pursue. The Thatcher governments had borne the brunt of
economic recession, dogmatically applying the policies that they considered were necessary
to salvage the British economy. This had been achieved against a backdrop of an industrial
infrastructure ill prepared - unlike other European countries - to accommodate such radical
market  policies  accompanied  by  the  promotion  of  self-employment,  competition  policy,
deregulation,  privatisation,  reform of  the  public  sector  and changes  to  the  tax  and social
security system.31 In Great Britain, the inevitable hardship generated by such a societal change
was seen as the price worth paying in order to re-establish the nation’s position on the world
market.
The Major governments in the 1990s inherited a situation whereby many of the supposedly
unnecessary institutional constraints on the labour market had been removed. In return for
this, employment had had to bear the brunt of adjusting to changes in the product markets, in
the production process and in the basic structure of supply and demand. Their job had been
made easier by the lack of organised labour resistance and by the acceptance of the fact that
28 Anne-Marie DAUNE-RICHARD, op. cit., p. 222.
29 Gerry & Janine RODGERS, op. cit., “Introduction”, p. 29.
30 Hansard, June 18, 1997, cols. 314 & 315.
31 Mark BEATSON, Labour Market Flexibility, Employment Market Research Unit, Department of 
Employment, Research Series n° 48, April 1995, pp. 134-138.
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traditional  work  practises  were  no  longer  a  viable  alternative  to  the  requirements  of  the
modern  market.  Despite  the  short  recession  that  lasted  from  1990  to1992,  increased
competition  continued  to  intensify  the  pressure  on  firms  to  minimise  cost  and  maximise
efficiency with clear implications for the flexibility of workforces. At the same time, workfare
policies  imported  directly  from  America  and  inspired  by  influential  economists  such  as
Charles Murray and Laurence Mead were gradually restricting the scope for people to remain
dependant on welfare especially with the increasing possibility of supplementing income from
part-time work. The overall trend was to maximise the contribution of labour to the income
maintenance  of  the  unemployed.  While  the  incidence  of  means-tested  benefits  steadily
increased, greater efforts were also deployed in ensuring that claimants were available for and
actively seeking work. To this end a plethora of active labour market policies were organised
under  the  auspices  of  the  Employment  Service  while  the  Jobseekers’  Allowance  was
introduced in October 1996 in order to tighten up the control on payment of contributory
benefits to the unemployed.32
If the claimant-count-based unemployment rate is used to assess the performance of the
British labour market, figures show a drop to 5.5% in 1990 from the record 11% in 1983. The
short recession in 1990-92 witnessed a peak of just over 10% before a decline to 7.9% in
1996.33 Since then and as stated before, the rate has steadily declined to a present rate of some
3% (January 2002). In light of these figures, it would seem at first glance that flexibilisation
coupled  with  employability  policies  have  considerably  contributed  to  a  reduction  in
unemployment. Added to this, the employment to working-age population ratio is above the
OECD average  which  would  suggest  a  higher  job creation  capacity  than  other  European
countries.  The steep rise in  female  participation  rates  is  a case in  point  even though this
particular phenomenon can also be put down to changing attitudes towards work and above
all  to  the important  growth in  the service sector  almost  as if  there were some reciprocal
dynamism between the two.34
In 1998, the Confederation of British Industry conducted a survey of some 5000 employers
and enthusiastically came to the conclusion that flexible work patterns had gone further than
this  original  remit  of  tackling  unemployment  to  embrace  other  aspects  of  the  market
economy:
This  survey  shows  the  vitality  and  variety  of  employment  policies  and  practises
throughout  British business.  It  demonstrates  that  Britain’s  flexible  labour markets  are
continuing to evolve with benefits for both employers and employees. It suggests that this
evolution  is  skills  led,  with  high  levels  of  training  activity  and  the  promotion  of
employability.  Encouragingly this investment in training is now allowing employees to
drive change in other employment areas – most especially in the growth of competency-
based pay schemes.35
The survey concluded by stating that the overall increase in temporary and part-time staff was
likely to continue with larger firms adapting better to the advantages of outsourcing.
32 For information concerning these active labour market policies see Catherine CORON, “Formation et emploi: 
le débat actuel”, in, Martine AZUELOS & Marie-Claude ESPOSITO (CERVEPAS), op. cit., p. 256.
33 All information taken from “Implementing the OECD’s Jobs Strategy”, in, OECD, Economic Survey: United 
Kingdom, 1996, p. 83.
34 It is quite legitimate to question whether the British employment miracle would have taken place at all without
the explosion of jobs in the service sector.
35 William MERCER, Employment Trends Survey 1998, Measuring Flexibility in the Labour Market, CBI, 1998,
p.1. What must be remembered is that out of the 2.4 million employees covered by the survey 92% worked in 
the private sector and the remaining 8% in the public sector. A further distortion is added by the fact that only 
9% of the workforce questioned worked part-time whereas the national average was 23%.
11
While the CBI exalts New Labour congratulates itself for its flagship New Deal including
the Welfare  to  Work programme which has conjugated active labour  market  policies  and
workfare  within  the  scope  of  employability  and  flexible  work  patterns.36 Results  of  the
programme to date are mitigated especially because of the “dead weight” involved. This is
due to either candidates who would have found employment in spite of the New Deal and
who absorb even so a proportion of the available finances, or candidates who drift from one
subsidised job to another  with little  long-term employment  perspective as employers  take
advantage of this cheaper labour to “hire and fire” at will. For the time being, only the New
Deal for Young People has made unemployment benefits conditional on accepting some form
of remunerated activity. The relative success of this particular part of the New Deal would
suggest that the threat of benefits withdrawal is an efficient incentive for the unemployed to
take up work.
The  result  of  the  flexibilisation  of  working  patterns  introduced  by  the  Conservative
governments  during  their  eighteen  years  in  power  and  continued  by  the  current  Labour
government - despite its adherence to the European Social Charter - has undeniably been a
considerable increase in precarious employment.37 In 1998, the OECD considered that [t]he
UK labour market  is  now one of  the least  regulated among OECD countries  as  regards
restrictions  on terms and conditions  of  employment,  working times and hiring and firing
rules.38 Firms  have  tended  to  concentrate  their  resources  on  core  workers  who  are
supplemented  if  need be by peripheral  employees  whose precarious  work status  has been
made more legitimate by the concept of employability.  Core employees are insulated from
product  market  variability  and uncertainty  by the  employment  of  a  periphery of  workers
brought in and out as economic conditions change. The direct employment relationship with
this periphery can be broken altogether through he use of sub-contracted labour. To this end,
work that cannot be undertaken by core employees or which falls outside the main occupation
of firms - such as cleaning and catering facilities - is “outsourced” to a predominantly female
part-time workforce who are excluded from organisation and who work more and more on the
fringes of the labour market. This pattern is compounded by take-up of “in-work” benefits
especially for families with children.39
Flexibility can mean one thing to employers and another to employees.40 For the former it
can indeed be the ideal way to adapt the core workforce’s productivity to the ebb and flow of
the deregulated market while entailing family-friendly practises for the latter. Nevertheless, it
would seem that  excessive market  orientated flexibility  which revolves essentially  around
considerations of employability has ushered in a period rife with poor quality jobs that can
ultimately  lead  to  a  form  of  underemployment  concealed  by  the  overall  reduction  in
unemployment.
When advocates of flexibility point to the UK’s success by counting the heads of those
in jobs, they fail to spot the qualitative changes in the nature of these jobs. The UK is not
36 For further information on the Welfare to Work programme see my article in Timothy WHITTON (ed), Le 
New Labour: Rupture ou Continuité?, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2000, pp. 263-282.
37 Flexible work patterns include shift work, subcontracting (or outsourcing), flexible working hours, job sharing,
homeworking, annualised hours, term-time working, ‘zero hours’ contract (no hours specified in contract of 
employment) and teleworking. See Employment Trends Survey, 1998, H.M.S.O., p. 11.
38 OECD, Economic Survey: United Kingdom, 1998, p. 89.
39 Family Credit and more recently Working Families’ Tax Credit, both of which imply using public money to 
“top-up” wages deemed to be insufficient in view of the recipient’s family circumstances. For more information 
on this particular point see my two articles: Timothy WHITTON, “Income Supplementing and the Poverty Trap:
Speenhamland Revisited?” op. cit., & Timothy WHITTON in Martine AZUELOS & Marie-Claude ESPOSITO, 
op. cit., p. 272.
40 See Peter REILLY, Flexibility at Work. Balancing the Interests of Employer and Employee, Aldershot: Gower,
2001 and more particularly chapters three and six.
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so much solving the problem of unemployment as transforming it into a different one: the
poor quality of employment.41
Hence, by virtue of promoting the merits of employability and flexibility, many hundreds of
thousands of so-called “Mcjobs” have been created and it is precisely this sort of employment
which  characterises  the  precariousness  of  the  British  labour  market.42 To  a  great  extent
“[t]hese forms of employment are on the increase and seem to have become a necessary step
when  first  entering  the  labour  market”.43 But  in  a  context  of  high  unemployment  this
particular form of precarious labour has become a permanent trend:
In a European context where unemployment levels are increasing in many EU Member
States, examining the quality of employment and working conditions might at first glance
seem to be less crucial than the need to find jobs, of whatever kind, for people in order to
take them off the unemployment lists.44(emphasis added)
Ideally, flexibility would mean giving employers the opportunity to manage their workforces
to meet fluctuating demand but the precarious work status that has emerged from this type of
contract has further undermined job quality on the margins of the labour market:
Workers  at  the  insecure  end of  the  flexible  labour  market  are  denied  many of  the
contractual benefits enjoyed by their more traditional full-time, permanent counterparts,
such as holiday entitlement and adequate rates of pay – often in sectors where pay rates
are already extremely low. This contractual discrimination is compounded by the way in
which some employers attempt to use flexible arrangements to undermine the statutory
rights of their workers, such as the right to redundancy pay or protection against unfair
dismissal. Both these features contribute to the third common strand, which is the extreme
vulnerability experienced by many workers in today’s flexible labour market, in terms of
their job security and general conditions of employment.45
It would seem that the British policy of not intervening directly in the regulation of the labour
market has indirectly encouraged the development of atypical employment during a period of
high unemployment and therefore of relatively low pay.  Protecting pay could prevent this
trend from worsening and to this end, the recent introduction of a national minimum wage
could correspond to the government’s acknowledgment of the limits of market labour policies
that seek to enhance employability and flexibility.
The national minimum wage
In the run-up to the introduction of the national minimum wage (NMW) in Great Britain,
the Low Pay Commission (LPC) headed by professor Bain entered an extensive round of
consultation with government’s main partners. The Commission’s main aim was to avoid the
disemployment  pitfalls  of  an  over  ambitious  NMW  which  had  consistently  fuelled
government reticence to intervene. While Labour had traditionally preferred to rely on the
trade unions to protect the low paid, the Conservatives - especially in more recent times -
believed that pay should be decided by the market  according to the employee’s worth, in
41 Steve FLEETWOOD, “Less Unemployment, but more Bad Employment”, The Guardian, 13 September 1999,
p. 15.
42 Fast-food “restaurants” such as McDonalds are well known for the precarious nature of work contracts and an 
exceptionally high labour force turnover. Emma BROCKES, “McJobs, the low-paid, grease-shovelling anti-
assignments that marked the bridge between the end of the manufacturing boom and the rise of its replacement, 
the call-centre”, in, The Guardian, 04 December, 1999, p. 94.
43 Véronique LETOURNEAUX, op cit., a), p. V.
44 Ibid.
45 Citizens’ Advice Bureau, Flexibility Abused: a CAB Evidence Report on Employment Conditions in the 
Labour Market, London: National Association of Citizens’ Advice Bureaux, 1997, p. 2, §10.
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terms of productivity, to his employer.46 According to the consultation organised by the LPC,
the various employer organisations felt that a development rate for young people was essential
if they were to be given the chance of gaining a foothold on the labour market. This was fully
associated with the sort of active labour market policies fostered, for example, by the vast
Welfare to Work programme.47 Examples from abroad have tended to support the employers’
position  and  are  echoed  by  OECD  findings:  “Not  surprisingly,  therefore,  the  French
unemployment statistics still reveal large groups of unqualified persons and inexperienced
youth, since the cost of labour at SMIC level has long been an impediment to hiring these
persons”.48
In a report published six months after the introduction of the NMW, the Trades Union
Congress declared its hostility towards the development rate for young people declaring that
in  the  name  of  flexibility,  the  “structural  employability  of  young  workers  would  be
reduced”.49 This is exactly where the NMW can play a vital role in bolstering government
attempts  to  encourage  work  take-up  rather  than  dependency  on  benefits  by  acting  as  a
political instrument to protect the workforce from the most pernicious effects of flexibility
and policies designed exclusively to improve worker employability. Whereas low wages not
only encourage potential employees to continue to rely on benefits, they can also discourage
them from attempting to find and hold down paid employment  at all. In this respect, low
wages  and  a  fortiori a  low  statutory  minimum  wage  can  frustrate  efforts  to  translate
employability  into  jobs.  At  the  same  time  they  also  run  counter  to  New  Labour’s
interpretation of employability which is based less on the rate of unemployment and far more
on “ensuring that opportunities and incentives to work are available to all”. 50
One way to promote a more social NMW would be to concentrate political involvement on
the efficiency wage. According once again to classical theory, if the cost of work increases,
employers can, amongst a plethora of options, choose to shed jobs. On the other hand, in
order to offset part of the increase in labour costs, they can attempt to develop and increase
the value of work by investing more in training for example. The effect of this might not be a
direct increase in productivity but above all an improvement in employee commitment to the
firm. This in turn could translate into a reduction of staff turnover for which the low paying
sectors are notorious.
Needless  to  say  that  the  efficiency  wage is  a  feasible  option  only  when  the  value  of
precarious employment that comes within the scope of the NMW can be enhanced in the first
place. It could be argued that any employment that needs wages protection entails a certain
degree of precariousness to the extent that a situation of quasi monopsony is created.51 As a
result in many cases employees directly affected by the NMW have more or less the same
professional  characteristics  as  far  as  their  productivity  is  concerned:  a  shop assistant,  an
employee  working  for  a  cleaning  agency  or  a  canteen  worker  –  among  the  lowest  paid
workers in Great Britain – cannot reasonably expect their productivity to increase radically
thanks to any amount of investment in training. But whereas wage protection can increase the
46 See my article “Labour’s National Minimum Wage”, op. cit.
47 See articles by Catherine CORON and Timothy WHITTON in, Martine AZUELOS & Marie-Claude 
ESPOSITO op. cit.
48 OECD, Economic Survey : France, 2000, p. 75.
49 Anne DAVIE, “Les effets du salaire minimum sur l’emploi et sur la flexibilité du travail au Royaume Uni”, in,
Martine AZUELOS & Marie-Claude ESPOSITO op. cit., p. 226.
50 OECD, 1998 UK, op. cit., p. 74.
51 The classic textbook example of monopsony is a Candian lumber industry where the sole employer can limit 
employment on offer in order to restrain wage claims. If a statutory minimum wage is introduced there is no 
point anymore in his restricting employment. This (mis)led the minimum wage lobby to claim that the NMW 
could create employment. See my article “Labour’s National Minimum Wage”, op. cit., p. 120.
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attractiveness  of  such  work  and  indeed  create  some  jobs  in  virtue  of  the  situation  of
monopsony that exists at the lower end of the labour market, the adoption of efficiency wage
principles specifically designed to promote the intrinsic value of atypical employment could
improve productivity in terms of commitment.  This is  all  the more true in a professional
relationship  that  requires  work  patterns  based  on  optimum  flexibility  with  part-time
employment being an ideal example.
As yet, the Low Pay Commission has chosen to ignore the TUC’s demand to discard the
development  rates  for  young  people  and  in  doing  so  has  preferred  to  favour  the
competitiveness of the NMW rather than any form of efficiency wage. By doing this and
given the  British  government’s  market  leanings  whereby employment  policies  are  tightly
linked  to  workfare  policies  with  full  integration  of  flexibility  and  employability,  the
workforce that is  emerging at the lower end of the spectrum is creating an ever growing
situation of monopsony. In this respect and despite the genuine protection it provides for the
lowest paid, the NMW is also proving to be a useful instrument within the overall coercive
package  of  measures  designed to  force  the  unemployed  onto  the  labour  market.  Without
specific  measures  to  protect  the  precariousness  of  atypical  employment,  the  national
minimum wage is likely to allow this particular segment of the labour market to become even
more legitimate within the overall distribution of jobs.
Conclusion
In view of these remarks what can be said about the British employment paradigm? There
is no questioning the fact that the officially recognised rate of unemployment has reached an
all-time low. Yet in classic economic theory a population at work can provide government
with the necessary fiscal revenues to invest in the sort of public services that people have
come to expect - for better or for worse - since the Labour party’s landslide victory in 1945.
At that time, it must be said, there was a strong political tendency to associate public welfare
with policies of full employment. At present, the quantitative merits of Britain’s employment
policies often disguise the fact that the other side of the coin offers a far bleaker picture. 
While  the  main  pillars  of  the  welfare  state  continually  suffer  from a  chronic  lack  of
investment, the number of jobless households is also on the increase. By deliberately fostering
different  forms  of  precarious  employment,  governments  have contributed  to  an alienation
from the basic ethics of work on which flagship projects such as the New Deal can only have
a  limited  impact.  Yet,  in  reality  there  is  little  to  show  that  there  has  been  any  overall
employment  trend  which  has  embraced  precarious  employment.  Generally  speaking,  and
despite conventional wisdom, the vast majority of jobs are still long-term and stable. In this
respect, precarious employment has evolved out of a whole patchwork of factors such as a
shift towards services and the rising involvement of women in the labour market. It has been
affected to some extent by the adoption of new technologies whilst competition born from
globalisation has also taken its toll. Even so, precarious employment is more the result of the
fringes of the labour market being denied the advantages of their mainstream counterparts and
because  trade  unions  concentrate  their  efforts  on  these  core  workers,  the  minority  of
peripheral workers have to put up with whatever “trickles down”. Precarious employment in
its worst form is rife in Great Britain and to classify it as merely “atypical”, as if it were only
a quaint reminder of the inevitable consequences of industrialisation, plays into the hands of
those who feel that it does not deserve any specific political involvement. Because precarious
work  fits  in  perfectly  with  government’s  plans  to  enhance  employability  and  promote
flexibility it has become an acceptable segment of the labour market rather than a springboard
towards better quality employment. 
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In its 1998 study, the OECD clearly praised the high level of employment in Great Britain
but equally clearly stated that “In line with growing income inequality,  the incidence and
concentration of poverty have increased dramatically in the United Kingdom”, and further on,
“Compared with other OECD countries, the level of income inequality in the United Kingdom
is currently considerably above average, with Nordic countries being among the most equal
and the United States the least equal”. It is quite understandable that foreign observers may
be taken in by the apparent buoyancy of the British labour market especially when they see
that  setting  up  business  there  is  apparently  cheap  and red  tape  minimal.  Perhaps  if  they
attempted to find good quality state funded education for their children, health care for their
families  and  support  for  elderly  parents,  they  would  quickly  realise  that  the  British
employment  paradigm  does  not  concern  everybody.  In  their  pamphlet  Avenue  du  Plein
Emploi, ATTAC concluded on post-liberal full employment thus: “What is needed is lasting
growth and a genuine reduction in the working week in order to bring down unemployment in
Europe  on a  long-term basis  without  taking  the  Anglo-Saxon path  that  has  led  to  mass
poverty”.52 When - as so often is the case in Great Britain -  precarious employment is an
obvious stepping-stone towards poverty it deserves the sort of political attention that simple
faith in the market cannot provide.
52 “Il faut donc une croissance durable et une vraie réduction du temps de travail pour faire reculer durablement
le chômage en Europe sans emprunter la voie anglo-saxonne de la pauvreté de masse”.
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